Functionalism as a dualist and a monist theory
Or the kind key is a functional kind.
To deal with the Mind-Body Problem we evidently need conceptions of both mental and neural events. There may be metal keys, wood keys, plastic keys, digital keys, or key-words. Again, though he would convincingly mimic communication, he would be aware only of the symbols and rules, not of the meaning behind them. The problem of consciousness: what is consciousness? Evolution is full of useless or even harmful by-products. Observe the structure of its states and the dynamics of its passage. The most promising candidates are those that treat belief as a relation. Ross, A. Further, there is very impressive neuroscientific evidence for the hypothesis. It can, perhaps, therefore, break the stalemate which faces the debate over diachronic identity. An individual can address his or her perspective as a monist, dualist or functionalist.
It rules out, for example, the central idea of Dualist Interactionism. Ross, A.
One might plausibly claim that no similar overlap of constitution can be applied to the counterfactual identity of minds. However, at the end of the story, there are sufficient explanations of those events within the individual.
So, the reasoning goes, even if functionalism works for intentional states, it does not work for consciousness. This means that a particular person's soul is no more than his nature as a human being. Does the body necessarily need a mind? For example, an actual metal and plastic machine satisfying the machine table might be made of gears, wheels, pulleys and the like, in which case the realization of S1 would be a mechanical state; or the realization of S1 might be an electronic state, and so forth. Too much stress is placed on harmony and the potential for conflict and its affects are generally ignored. Or are mental states and physical states entirely distinct? One might say that we need more than the language of physics to describe and explain the weather, but we do not need more than its ontology. Kim, J. But see the section on functionalism and physicalism below.
It has taken this class of events to have a cause, and hypothesized about the nature of that cause. Clearly cause and effect operates in the realm of consciousness, but it will take great care to state precisely and correctly the nature of the things which are interacting and the ways in which they do so.
So we will need a more sophisticated theory, one that involves some sort of combinatorial apparatus. As it seems to Tyler Burge, the Individualism of the Union Theory is faulted by what is taken to be the provable proposition that there is no sufficient explanation of at least certain mental events within the individual.
This is a very appealing Cartesian intuition: my identity as the thinking thing that I am is revealed to me in consciousness, it is not something beyond the veil of consciousness. What it can contain, are state machines which are structurally isomorphic to these things.
For example: The problem of embodiment: what is it for the mind to be housed in a body? This allows our team to focus on improving the library and adding new essays.
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